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In the same way, categorization influences emotional reactions to other groups. People thinking about themselves as students, for example, often react with considerable anger and little respect for the police. Such changes in emotion do not depend on re-categorizations that make the target part of the ingroup. The evidence is unequivocal: self-categorization determines emotional reactions, and identification with the group by and large heightens its impact. Such findings do not rely on heavy-handed reminders of group membership or social pressure to get people to think like a group member.

Why does thinking about themselves as women, Americans, or Democrats change how people feel? How can the same person experience quite different emotions about the same object depending on how he or she is categorized?

We have explored two processes that contribute to this outcome. The first depends on the fact that people in different groups see the world in very different ways. We call this the intergroup appraisal route to intergroup emotions. The second process produces emotions as a direct consequence of group membership, parallel to the changes in group-typical traits, thoughts, and actions that occur with self-categorization.

Unique combinations of appraisals produce the wide range of distinct and specific emotions that individuals experience. When people are categorized as group members, however, they see the world not in terms of the implications of events and objects for them personally, but in terms of the implications for their ingroup. Events or objects including ingroup and outgroups, and their members that negatively impact the ingroup or any of its members are appraised negatively even if the self is personally unharmed.

Similarly, people or circumstances that benefit the group as a whole or any of its members although not necessarily the self are positively appraised. So the murder of an ingroup member because of his or her group membership evokes fear or anger in other group members, despite the fact that they remain physically unharmed. Just as with individual emotions, unique combinations of group-based appraisals produce the same wide range of distinct and specific intergroup emotions.

Imagine, for example, that the stellar performance of an individual Russian sportswoman spoils the chances of America winning a coveted gold medal in swimming. People who naturally adopt an American perspective, as well as those induced to do so, view the first event as a failure and the second event as a success.

Emotional self-stereotyping route to intergroup emotions When people see themselves in group terms, they also come to see themselves as having characteristics typical of the group. Whenever group membership is salient, so too are the group-typical emotional reactions.

Part of being a Yankees baseball fan, for example, is to experience anger and disgust at Boston Red Sox victories, just as part of being an Arsenal fan is to feel anger and disgust about Manchester United fans. If emotions are associated with a particular group membership, people thinking about themselves as members of that group should experience those emotions.

As we have already seen, this happens: the mere activation of group belonging can cause members of a group to report experiencing shared anger or joy or disgust, even when other group members are not present. If experiencing such emotions results from the adoption of group-typical emotions, then finding out that the group norm is different from what one imagined should also change the emotions group members experience.

It does. They were then led to think of themselves as Americans, and as a result reported a different, slightly higher level of fear than they did as individuals.

Some time later, they were told that in a recent survey Americans reported feeling considerable levels of fear among other emotions. If the participants were again reminded of their nationality, they now reported experiencing the higher level of fear said to be typical of Americans. But if the same people were led instead to think about themselves as unique individuals and asked about their fear, their responses were unchanged from the very first assessment.

Belonging to a particular group thus entails experiencing emotions quite different from the emotions one feels as a unique individual, or as a member of a different group. The two psychological forces that contribute to this effect — intergroup appraisal and emotional self-stereotyping — probably work in conjunction.

Adopting a group perspective changes how the world is appraised, and appraisals dictate emotions. To the extent that specific events and objects are appraised differently by different groups, members of those different groups will experience different emotions. Regardless of how they arise, intergroup emotions are experienced by individuals on behalf of the ingroup.

It is not simply that group members feel empathy for other ingroup members who encounter good or ill fortune. On the contrary, intergroup emotion is emotion experienced as others: because ingroup members and the self are psychologically one, what befalls other group members befalls the self. When their national team wins the world cup, people are not thrilled because they believe the team members feel good. They are thrilled because it is as if they themselves won. What Are the Consequences of Intergroup Emotions?

We assume that intergroup emotions feel pretty much the same as individual emotions do. If other members of the ingroup but not the self are insulted, for example, people feel anger on behalf of the group, and this anger involves physiological arousal. Such findings indicate that physiological arousal is an inherent component of group-based anger, just as it is of individual anger. Individual anger also has the consequence of increasing confidence, which in turn affects how an angry person deals with his or her environment.

Intergroup anger aroused by insult or threat of harm to the ingroup carries the same consequences. People experiencing intergroup anger both fail to carefully analyze the content of a persuasive message and opt for more risky solutions to dilemmas than do people not so affected Rydell et al. Although research has not yet examined them in detail, we assume that other intergroup emotions, like group-based pride and sadness and guilt, also have the same phenomenological and psychological consequences as their individual counterparts.

Thus, whether generated in response to appraisals of actual events or activated by association with group membership, intergroup emotions have consequences for arousal, perception, information processing, judgment, and decision-making. When anger at a group insult leaves people aroused, detracts from their information processing, and prompts them to take risks they otherwise would not, it is unlikely that the anger is just for public display or just the result of activated theories about emotion.

In the same way that group members actually take on typical group characteristics as part of self-categorization, they actually experience typical group emotions as part of the same process. By far the most important consequence of intergroup emotions, however, is their influence on behavior. That is, anger involves the impulse, desire, or intention to take action against the source of the anger, just as fear involves the tendency to move away from the source of the fear.

As with individual emotion, so too with group-based emotion: specific intergroup emotions produce specific action tendencies. Because intergroup emotions are group-level, so too the behaviors they motivate often are as well Smith et al.

Thus, anger toward an outgroup increases desire to confront or attack or harm an outgroup, perhaps by physical force but also by opposing governmental policies that benefit the group, excluding them from opportunities to get ahead, and so forth.

The group-based appraisals that lead individuals identified with an ingroup to see them as threatening us lead to intergroup emotion we feel angry at them which motivates intergroup behavior: We support policies designed to prevent their immigration to our country.

Intergroup emotions can direct behavior in quite a fine-tuned manner. Leach, Iyer, and Pedersen recently found that guilt explains support for reparations but only ingroup-directed anger explains willingness to actually take political action to bring about reparations. In fact, if groups feel satisfaction rather than guilt after acting aggressively, support for similar aggression goes up Maitner et al. The close relation between inter- group emotions and the behaviors they motivate can also be seen by looking at what happens when emotions and behaviors mismatch.

For example, if an attack on the ingroup produces anger and a corresponding desire for retaliation, people experience satisfaction following retaliation.

But if an attack against the ingroup instead produces fear, retaliation further increases fear, and brings no satisfaction. Similarly, anger caused by an insult to the ingroup dissipates if the ingroup successfully retaliates, but does not do so if appropriate action is not taken. Thus, a wealth of evidence supports the idea that specific intergroup emotions produce both desires for and actual intergroup behaviors.

Intergroup emotions are a powerful force for both directing and regulating interactions between social groups. Their effects are highly specific: knowing whether a group regards another with anger, fear, disgust, guilt, or even admiration and respect tells you whether to expect confrontation, avoidance, exclusion, a desire to repair past wrongs, or actions of affiliation and support. This is why we accord intergroup emotions such a crucial role in intergroup relations. An understanding of intergroup emotions is also of practical importance because it suggests strategies to help reduce prejudice.

For example, psychologists have long known that increased contact with members of another group — at least under the right conditions — decreases prejudice against them. It is feeling the right emotions about the outgroup warmth, pride and not feeling the wrong ones anger, irritation, anxiety that makes the ingroup start to tolerate and like them, and only the kind of contact that produces those emotions will make that difference. Of course interventions other than intergroup contact might also produce equally effective intergroup emotions.

Sometimes those shared memberships are superordinate — as when antipathies between nationalities might be eradicated by forming a continent-wide economic and political union. Other times such shared memberships can be cross cutting — as when antagonism between Muslims and Christians is moderated because Christian women feel positively toward Muslim women. We suspect that both these interventions generate positive intergroup emotions, and that it is these emotions that drive better intergroup relations.

And as we noted earlier, a myriad of external cues or events can activate one or another categorization. In summary, IET argues that self-categorization determines emotional responses, especially for highly identified group members. As we have seen, the emotions you feel when you consider Muslims, gay men, immigration policies, or cultural practices depend on how you are thinking about yourself. And as we have seen, those emotions then determine the way you and your group behave.

First, IET claims that emotions are connected with categorizations and identities, rather than single biological entities. Emotion is not restricted to the individual level, but is also a social phenomenon, with collective antecedents and collective consequences.

Second, IET moves beyond the idea of a simple positive evaluation of ingroups and negative evaluation of outgroups, to focus on the distinct and differentiated emotional reactions that both ingroups and outgroups provoke. Different consequences follow depending on whether an outgroup is feared or despised or hated rather than merely negatively evaluated , requiring a rethinking of traditional views of prejudice.

Ingroups can evoke pride, satisfaction, or joy any of which might have differentiated consequences , requiring a rethinking of traditional views of ingroup favoritism. Third, IET assumes a variety of intergroup emotions can be associated with a multitude of intergroup identities. This variability resonates with the variability — and often inconsistency — of intergroup behavior. Are there individuals who get along fine with outgroup members at work but will not socialize with them after hours?

Since self-categorization determines emotions, and since individuals might identify with any of multiple group memberships, individuals are capable of multiple, often contradictory emotional reactions to other social groups. Are minority groups that used to be tolerated now the target of hate crimes? Fourth, IET focuses on action toward or against groups, rather than thoughts and beliefs about groups.

Emotion is readiness for action, and intergroup emotion is readiness for intergroup action. Although names may often hurt, it is sticks and stones that break outgroup bones. Finally, IET regards intergroup emotions as integral to adaptive functioning at the group level perhaps inevitably so given our species history of group living.

Intergroup emotions are not solely events that disrupt intergroup relations; rather, they are events with group-sustaining functions. This does not mean that anger and hate for an outgroup are good things just because they might be functional for an ingroup.

But it does mean that we need to understand them as central to a process that regulates actions in the context of important group memberships. Many centuries ago the Roman philosopher Cicero argued that people decide more problems by emotion — by hate, love, lust, rage, sorrow, joy, hope, and fear — than by rationality, reason, or reality.

We believe that to truly understand intergroup relations, both these ideas need to be combined. Short Biographies Diane M. She is particularly interested in the interplay of affective and cognitive processes in all aspects of intergroup relations.

Eliot R. He also has a special chair position at the Free University in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Much of his current research focuses on the role of emotion in intergroup relations.

With Diane Mackie, he has edited a book From Prejudice to Intergroup Emotions on the role of emotion in prejudice and intergroup conflict. Devin is particularly interested in how recruiting different social categories to inform the self-concept can lead people to behave in different, sometimes contradictory, ways. Email: mackie psych. Negative affect and social judgment: The differential impact of anger and sadness. European Journal of Social Psychology.

Special Issue: Affect in social judgments and cognition, 24, 45— Campbell, D. Ethnocentric and other altruistic motives. Levine Ed. Crisp, R. Multiple social categorization.

Zanna Ed. Orlando, FL: Academic Press. Devine, P. The regulation of implicit race bias: The role of motivations to respond without prejudice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, — Doosje, B. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, — Dumont, M. Social categorization and fear reactions to the September 11th terrorist attacks. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, — Esses, V.

The role of emotions in determining willingness to engage in intergroup contact. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28, — Fiske, S. Stereoytping, Prejudice, and Discrimination. Gilbert, S. Lindzey Eds. Frijda, N. Relations among emotion, appraisal, and emotional action readiness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, — Gaertner, S. The common ingroup identity model: Recategorization and the reduction of intergroup bias.

Hewstone Eds. Chichester, UK: Wiley. Gordijn, E. Emotional reactions to harmful intergroup behavior. European Journal of Social Psychology, 36, 15 — Social comparison, self-stereotyping, and gender differences in self-construals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90, — Hewstone, M.

Contact and categorization: Social psychology interventions to change intergroup relations. Macrae, C.

Hogg, M. Intergroup behaviour, self-stereotyping and the salience of social categories. British Journal of Social Psychology, 26, — Iyer, A. Why individuals protest the perceived transgressions of their country: The role of anger, shame, and guilt. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33, — Leach, C.

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